Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
1999
OFFICE OF THE CLERK

No. 99-182

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

ROSEMARIE PINK,

Petitioner,

v.

MODOC INDIAN HEALTH PROJECT, INC., *et al.*,

Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION FOR RESPONDENTS MODOC INDIAN HEALTH PROJECT, INC. AND ERIN FORREST

ROBERT J. LOGAN
Attorney for Respondents
Modoc Indian Health Project, Inc.
and Erin Forrest
255 West Julian Street
Suite 302
San Jose, CA 95110
(408) 287-2156

154794

Counsel Press LLC
FORMERLY LUTZ APPELLATE SERVICES
(800) 274-3321 • (800) 359-6859

STATEMENT PURSUANT TO RULE 29.6

Respondent, Modoc Indian Health Project, Inc. has no parent corporation and no publicly held company owns 10% or more of its stock.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Statement Pursuant to Rule 29.6	i
Table of Contents	ii
Table of Cited Authorities	v
Basis for Jurisdiction	1
Statement of the Case	1
A. Background	1
1. Alturas and Cedarville Rancherias	2
2. Modoc Indian Health Project, Inc.	3
3. Erin Forrest	4
Questions Presented by Pink	4
A. Does a provision in a tribal constitution, which expressly limits a tribes jurisdiction to within the boundaries of the reservation, stop the tribe from creating a corporation which would enjoy the status of a tribe if the offices and activities of the corporation are outside the reservation and outside Indian Country?	4

Contents

		Page
1.	Modoc is Protected by Parent Tribe Immunity	4
	a. Modoc's Geographical Location is Irrelevant	5
	b. Employee Grievances Are an Internal Tribal Affair	6
	c. ISDA Tribal Organizations Govern Their Own Employment Affairs	7
B.	Is a tribal corporation located off reservation and created by a consortium of tribes, whose constitutions limit the tribes' jurisdictions to their reservations, exempt from Title VII?	8
1.	"Indian Tribes" Exempt from Title VII	8
2.	Modoc Is Exempt from Title VII Claims	8
	a. Modoc's Geographical Location is Irrelevant	9
3.	Is a tribal corporation immune from suit in federal court when no tribal court exists?	9

Contents

Page

a. Tribal Administrative Remedies Existed 9

Misstatements of Fact or Law Contained in Petitioner's Brief 10

A. Facts 10

B. Law 11

1. Pink's Apparent Reliance On Various Court Decisions Is Misplaced And Can Be Distinguished. 11

Conclusion 15

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases:

A & A Concrete, Inc. v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 781 F.2d 1411 (9th Cir. 1986) 4

Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't et al., 522 U.S. 520 (1998) 12, 13, 14

Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344(1991) 1

Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1975) 7

California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1986) 7

Dille v. Council of Energy Resource Tribes, 801 F.2d 373 (10th Cir. 1986) 8, 9, 14

Edward Krempel v. Prairie Island, 125 F.3d 621 (8th Cir. 1997) 11

EEOC v. Fond du Lac Heavy Equip. and Const., 986 F.2d 246 (8th Cir. 1993) 6

In Re Greene, 980 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1992) 4, 5, 6

Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949) 5

Cited Authorities

	Page
Miller v. Maxwell's International, Inc., 991 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1993), *cert. denied*, 510 U.S. 1109 (1994)	8
Nat'l Farmers Union Cos. v. The Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845 (1985)	8, 10, 11, 12
New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983)	7
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Potawatomi Tribe, 498 U.S. 505 (1991)	7
Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832 (1982)	7
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978)	6
Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997)	12
Superior Oil Co. v. United States, 605 F. Supp. 674 (C. D. Utah 1985), *rev'd on other grounds*, 798 F.2d 1324 (1986)	5
United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1977)	10
Weeks Constr., Inc. v. Oglala Sioux Hous. Auth., 797 F.2d 668 (8th Cir. 1986)	5

Cited Authorities

	Page
Statutes:	
25 U.S.C. § 450(a)(1)	7
25 U.S.C. § 450f(a)	3
25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479	2
25 U.S.C. § 477	3
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634	6
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)	8
Rule:	
United States Supreme Court Rule 10	1

BASIS FOR JURISDICTION

"Review on a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but judicial discretion." Sup. Ct. R. 10. Petitioner claims that this matter should be heard because the ruling of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is in conflict with the decisions of other appellate courts, with opinions of this Court and with congressional mandates. However, she does not provide any case or congressional citations to support this claim. In fact, the decision of the Ninth Circuit is consistent with decisions of other appellate courts, opinions of this Court and congressional mandates.

The principal purpose for which the United States Supreme Court uses certiorari jurisdiction is to resolve conflicts among Circuit Courts of Appeals and state courts concerning the meaning of provisions of federal law. *See Braxton v. United States*, 500 U.S. 344(1991). Because the issue of tribal sovereign immunity for tribal organizations has been resolved consistently among the Circuit Courts of Appeals, granting a writ of certiorari in this matter is unnecessary.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Background

Petitioner Rosemarie Pink ("Pink") was employed by the Modoc Indian Health Project ("Modoc"). In 1993, Pink was terminated by the Modoc Project Director, Erin Forrest ("Forrest"). In 1994, Pink filed a complaint in federal district court against Modoc, Forrest and Indian Health Services ("IHS") for employment discrimination, sexual harassment, and breach of contract. Both the District Court and the Court

of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit dismissed Pink's claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to Modoc's tribal sovereign immunity.

1. *Alturas and Cedarville Rancherias*

Modoc's and Forrest's Indian sovereign immunity originates in the federally recognized status of the tribal governments of the Alturas and Cedarville Rancherias.

The Alturas and Cedarville Rancherias are located in rural northeast California, in Modoc County. They are among several dozen federally recognized tribes with federally recognized systems of Indian tribal self-government. The Rancheria governments operate on the basis of Constitutions and By-laws drafted and approved by the Secretary of the Interior pursuant to the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479. ("Reorganization Act").

The Rancherias are governed by popularly elected tribal general or community councils. The Tribal Councils, in turn, exercise authority to create tribal business or Executive Committees and other committees as they see fit to undertake tribal purposes. The Tribal Councils and Committees together have broad legislative and administrative powers in running the official affairs of the Rancherias.

Under their respective Constitutions, the Councils and Committees of both Rancherias apply for and oversee administration of federal contracts and grants, including self-determination programs they undertake themselves or through Modoc. The Rancherias have indirect control over the daily administration of Modoc's Indian Self Determination Act ("ISDA") grants from the IHS, by virtue of the control the Rancherias have over Modoc.

2. *Modoc Indian Health Project, Inc.*

Modoc is an "Indian Corporation" incorporated and chartered by the Rancherias under authority of the Solicitor of Indian Affairs and Section 477 of the Reorganization Act. *See* 25 U.S.C. § 477.

Modoc is, and at all times relevant to this litigation was, a "Tribal Organization" within the meaning of the ISDA and other federal statutes. *See* ISDA, 25 U.S.C. § 450f(a). Modoc's service area for its IHS contracts is the native American population of all of Modoc County, except the Fort Bidwell Indian Reservation. Modoc's offices are located in the City of Alturas in Modoc County within the service area.

Modoc management is composed of a Board of Directors selected exclusively from the Alturas and Cedarville Rancherias' governing Councils and Committees. Modoc Board members are selected and supervised in accordance with the political and cultural system establishing the Rancheria tribal government. Modoc's corporate charter states that Board members serve at the pleasure of those tribal governments. Member selection must be made in a manner consistent with the authority of the Rancheria tribal governments. Selection is therefore made in accordance with the federally approved and recognized Rancheria Constitution, Bylaws, ordinances, policies, and other legislative acts of the Tribal Councils.

The tribally-selected Board members, in turn, take an active and frequent role in Project administration and management. The Charter states that the business and administration of Modoc shall be managed by the tribally selected board members.

3. *Erin Forrest*

Erin Forrest is the Project Director for Modoc. Forrest is a nearly full-blooded Pit River Indian of the Hewise band, a tribe native to the area and a part of the Cedarville Rancheria. He was appointed Project Director by the Board of Directors of Modoc.

Forrest serves at the pleasure of Modoc Board Members. As Modoc Board members are subject to the Rancheria tribal politics and governing systems, Forrest is also subject to the control of those systems. Were any of the Rancheria tribal Councils or Committees dissatisfied with Mr. Forrest's performance, they could simply exercise their indirect control over Forrest.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED BY PINK

A. Does a provision in a tribal constitution, which expressly limits a tribe's jurisdiction to within the boundaries of the reservation, stop the tribe from creating a corporation which would enjoy the status of a tribe if the offices and activities of the corporation are outside the reservation and outside Indian Country?

1. *Modoc is Protected by Parent Tribe Immunity*

Numerous Circuit Courts of Appeals have held that tribal corporations carry the same immunity as their parent tribes, unless that immunity has been waived. *See In Re Greene*, 980 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1992) (involving a tribally-owned furniture store); *A & A Concrete, Inc. v. White Mountain Apache Tribe*, 781 F.2d 1411 (9th Cir. 1986) (considering a

reservation economic development enterprise). Relief against a tribal subsidiary organization is, in effect, relief against the tribe itself. *Superior Oil Co. v. United States*, 605 F. Supp. 674, 679 (C. D. Utah 1985), *rev'd on other grounds*, 798 F.2d 1324 (1986), *citing Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corp.*, 337 U.S. 682, 688 (1949). *See also Weeks Constr., Inc. v. Oglala Sioux Hous. Auth.*, 797 F.2d 668, 671 (8th Cir. 1986) ("suits against an agency like the Housing Authority normally are barred absent a waiver of sovereign immunity"). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision to afford Modoc the same immunity as the Alturas and Cedarville Rancherias was consistent with existing law.

a. *Modoc's Geographical Location is Irrelevant*

Despite consistent case law to the contrary, Pink asserts that, because Modoc is not located within the boundaries of either the Alturas or Cedarville Rancherias, tribal sovereign immunity has been waived. Pink's simplistic "on-reservation/ off-reservation" argument lacks merit. Pink's allegations claim wrongdoings on the premises of an ISDA organization. The issue is whether the locus of the dispute involved an internal tribal affair.

The decision of the Ninth Circuit that the location of Modoc's offices is irrelevant was consistent with its decision in *In Re Greene*, 980 F.2d 590. There, the Court found a furniture store located on a reservation was immune from a bankruptcy court's jurisdiction with respect to the store's business activities many hundreds of miles away in Montana. *Id.* at 592.

Important to the Court's holding in *In Re Greene* was the Self-Determination purpose of the tribal business entity.

Id. at 598. The court reasoned that subjecting tribal entities to litigation — merely because those entities were conducting business outside the boundaries of the reservation — would work against the Congressional policy of encouraging tribal economic development and self-determination. Similarly, the purpose of Modoc is to encourage tribal self-governance and self-determination. Failure to provide Modoc with sovereign immunity due to the geographic location of its offices would be contrary to the Congressional policy of encouraging self-determination and self-governance.

b. *Employee Grievances Are an Internal Tribal Affair*

This Court and other Circuit Courts of Appeals have found employee grievances to be internal tribal affairs, as did the Ninth Circuit in this case. *See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez*, 436 U.S. 49 (1978); *EEOC v. Fond du Lac Heavy Equip. and Const.*, 986 F.2d 246, 249 (8th Cir. 1993).

The Eighth Circuit has held that an age discrimination claim brought by an employee of a Chippewa tribal corporation involved "a strictly internal matter" and was, therefore, barred by the tribe's sovereign immunity. *Fond du Lac*, 986 F.2d at 249. The court ruled that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634, could not apply to a tribal business entity, on the grounds that the Act would affect the tribe's "specific right of self government". *Fond du Lac*, 986 F.2d at 249. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied heavily upon language in this Court's decision in *Santa Clara Pueblo,* that Indian tribes retain the power to regulate their "internal and social relations". *Santa Clara Pueblo,* 436 U.S. 49, 55; *Fond du Lac*, 986 F.2d at 248. Claims of employment discrimination and sexual harassment similarly are internal matters which should be resolved by the tribe or tribal organization.

c. *ISDA Tribal Organizations Govern Their Own Employment Affairs*

The ISDA provides substantial additional basis for a conclusion that a dispute between an ISDA Tribal Organization and an employee is not subject to review by a federal or state court. This Court has repeatedly recognized that the essential concept underlying "self-determination" under the ISDA is tribal self-government. *Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Potawatomi Tribe*, 498 U.S. 505, 510 (1991); *Bryan v. Itasca County*, 426 U.S. 373, 388 & n.14 (1975); *California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians*, 480 U.S. 202, 216 & n.19 (1986); *New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe*, 462 U.S. 324, 335 & n.17 (1983); *see also Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue*, 458 U.S. 832, 840 (1982).[1]

These findings stem from this Court's repeatedly expressed acknowledgment that in enacting ISDA and similar

---

1. The Supreme Court cases cited here often point to the ISDA's Congressional Statement of Findings that reflect the spirit of tribal self-determination under the ISDA:

> (a) The Congress, after careful review of the Federal Government's historical and special legal relationship with, and resulting responsibilities to, American Indian People, finds that —
>
> . . .
>
> (2) the Indian people will never surrender their desire to control their relationships both among themselves and with non-Indian governments, organizations, and persons.

25 U.S.C. § 450(a)(1).

statutes "Congress is committed to a policy of supporting *tribal self-government and self-determination*". *Nat'l Farmers Union Cos. v. The Crow Tribe of Indians*, 471 U.S. 845, 856 (1985). The decision of the Ninth Circuit in this case is consistent with this Court's acknowledgment of Congress' commitment to supporting tribal self-government and self-determination by extending tribal sovereign immunity to Modoc.

B. Is a tribal corporation located off reservation and created by a consortium of tribes, whose constitutions limit the tribes' jurisdictions to their reservations, exempt from Title VII?

1. *"Indian Tribes" Exempt from Title VII*

Title VII specifically exempts "Indian Tribe[s]" from liability of the sorts of claims actionable thereunder, by excluding them from the definition of "employer". *See* 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). Modoc and Forrest are entitled to the "Indian Tribe" exemption for all claims that are actionable under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b); *Miller v. Maxwell's International, Inc.*, 991 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1993), *cert. denied*, 510 U.S. 1109 (1994); *Dille v. Council of Energy Resource Tribes*, 801 F.2d 373 (10th Cir. 1986).

2. *Modoc Is Exempt from Title VII Claims*

The Ninth Circuit held that Modoc is exempt from Pink's tribe lawsuit because the Indian tribe exemption applies to enterprises created and managed by federally recognized tribes. This decision is consistent with the Tenth Circuit decision in *Dille*, 801 F.2d 373 (10th Cir. 1986). *Dille* involved a consortium enterprise of 39 tribes created to

develop Indian reservation energy resources. The consortium was sued by several female employees for sexual discrimination. The Tenth Circuit upheld a district court's dismissal.

The Tenth Circuit reviewed the legislative history of the "Indian Tribe" exemption and concluded that the consortium was "precisely the type of activity that Congress sought to encourage" by the exemption. *Id.* at 375. The court found that the purpose of the exemption was to enable tribes to have maximum control over their own enterprises. *Id.* at 375. Private civil rights of action against tribal enterprises would undermine such control.

The reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in this matter is consistent with the decision of the Tenth Circuit set forth in *Dille*. As was the case in *Dille*, Modoc is a consortium organization created by two federally recognized tribes. Also, as in *Dille*, the tribes maintain substantial management authority over Modoc's affairs. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which enforces Title VII, routinely rejects jurisdiction over such cases.

a. *Modoc's Geographical Location is Irrelevant*

See discussion *supra* Section II(A)(1)(a).

3. *Is a tribal corporation immune from suit in federal court when no tribal court exists?*

a. *Tribal Administrative Remedies Existed*

Although the Alturas and Cedarville Rancherias do not have formal tribal courts, tribal administrative remedies were

available to Pink. Pink was required, but failed, to exhaust the following "tribal administrative remedies": (1) appeal to Modoc Board via remedies and procedures set forth in the Personnel Policies Manual; (2) appeal to the Rancherias. This Court has repeatedly recognized that tribal administrative remedies need not be strictly "judicial" in order to be required to be exhausted. *See Nat'l Farmers Union*, 471 U.S. at 856; *United States v. Wheeler*, 435 U.S. 313 (1977). A hearing before Modoc's Board and a subsequent appeal to the tribal councils of the Alturas and Cedarville Rancherias would have afforded Pink the opportunity to have her claims heard. Her failure to avail herself of those remedies should not obviate the intent of Congress and this Court to assure tribal self-governance and self-determination.

MISSTATEMENTS OF FACT OR LAW CONTAINED IN PETITIONER'S BRIEF

A. Facts

Pink failed to comply with personnel policies which required her to file a complaint with Erin Forrest, as Project Director, and then appeal to the Board. The Department of Fair Employment and Housing ("DFEH"), did not recommend that she file a complaint against Forrest and Modoc. DFEH correctly determined that this was an internal tribal matter and, therefore, DFEH lacked jurisdiction to hear this matter. Although no formal tribal judicial system exists, formal appeal procedures are provided in the Modoc Personnel Policies. Pink failed to comply.

B. Law

Pink claims that the lower courts' decisions in this matter are inconsistent with decisions of other appellate courts, this Court and congressional mandates. That statement is in error.

1. *Pink's Apparent Reliance On Various Court Decisions Is Misplaced And Can Be Distinguished.*

To support her claim that this suit should be brought in federal court because no tribal judicial system exists for adjudicating complaints, Pink cites *Edward Krempel v. Prairie Island*, 125 F.3d 621 (8th Cir. 1997). The *Krempel* case is distinct from this case, in that, there were administrative and tribal remedies available to Pink. She deliberately chose to not avail herself of those remedies. In the *Krempel* case, tribal remedies were not available.

Pink also cites to *Nat'l Farmers Union*, 471 U.S. at 856, in support of her claim that deference to tribal courts is not absolute. This statement is inaccurate and misleading. In that case, this Court held that exhaustion of tribal remedies is required prior to consideration of the matter by the federal court.

> [T]he existence and extent of a tribal court's jurisdiction will require careful examination of tribal sovereignty, the extent to which that sovereignty has been altered, divested or diminished, as well as a detailed study of relevant statutes, Executive Branch policy as embodied in treaties and elsewhere and administrative or judicial decisions.

Id. at 855-856. In *Nat'l Farmers Union*, this Court addressed the commitment of Congress to support tribal self-government and self-determination and found that tribal remedies must be exhausted. Pink failed to exhaust the tribal remedies available to her.

Pink relies on the holding in *Strate v. A-1 Contractors*, 520 U.S. 438 (1997), that "the civil authority of Indian Tribes and their courts with respect to non-Indian fee lands generally does not extend to activities of nonmembers of the Tribe." However, *Strate* is distinguishable upon the facts. In *Strate*, the property in question was a state-maintained highway which traversed across a tribal reservation. A right-of-way had been granted to North Dakota for the purpose of allowing the general public access to a federal water project. The highway was open to the public and the traffic on the highway was subject to the state's control. Thus, because North Dakota, a non-Indian entity, exclusively controlled the highway, the court held that the state court was the proper jurisdiction for causes of action arising in relation to the highway.

In contrast, Modoc's control is retained by both the Alturas and Cedarville Rancherias through the Board of Directors. Modoc serves only the native American population of Modoc County as opposed to the general public served by the highway in *Strate*. While the health center is operated off Indian land, the property was leased by Modoc for the sole purpose of conducting internal tribal affairs (providing health services to the native Americans living in Modoc County). Thus, the holding in *Strate* is inapplicable to the situation created by Modoc.

Additionally, Pink mistakenly contends that the ruling in *Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't et al.*,

522 U.S. 520 (1998), is controlling in the case at bar. Pink quotes the following in her brief:

> The tribe contends that the requisite federal superintendence is present because the Federal Government provides desperately needed health, social, welfare, and economic programs to the Tribe. Brief for Respondents 28. The court of Appeals majority found this argument persuasive. 101 F.3d at 1301. Our Indian country precedents, however, do not suggest that the mere provision of desperately needed social programs can support a finding of Indian country. Such health, education, and welfare benefits are merely forms of general federal aid; considered either alone or in tandem with ANCSA's minimal land-related protections, they are not indicitive of active federal control over the Tribe's land sufficient to support a finding of federal superintendence.

Pink's Petition for Writ of Certiorari, pg. 7.

Pink wrongly asserts that because the Village of Venetie was not located within Indian Country, and jurisdiction over the activities of nonmembers on village land was absent, then similarly, since Modoc is not located within Indian country, the "mere fact that they [Modoc] enter into contracts which provide services to Indians does not give them authority beyond that of a service provider."

Once again, Pink fails to differentiate between the facts of *Venetie* and this case. In *Venetie*, this Court was deciding the issue of whether land that was transferred to private corporations consisting of Indian shareholders under the

Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act ("ANCSA") and then subsequently conveyed to a tribe is "Indian Country". In enacting ANCSA, Congress specifically intended to end federal supervision over Indian affairs. Congress intended to accomplish this without creating a reservation system or lengthy wardship or trusteeship.

"Because ANCSA revoked the Venetie Reservation, . . . whether the Tribe's land is Indian country depends on whether it falls within the 'dependent Indian communities' prong of the statute." *Id.* at 953. In footnote two the court noted, "only one Indian reservation, the Annette Island Reserve, survived ANSCA. Other Indian country exists in Alaska post-ANCSA only if the land in question meets the requirements of a 'dependent Indian community' under." *Id.* at 953.

The Alturas and Cedarville Rancherias do not need to meet the requirements of a "dependent Indian Community" because they are still Indian reservations under federal law. In *Venetie*, the land could be owned by non-Natives and used for non-Native purposes. Such is not the case with Modoc. Modoc's services can only be used by the native american population of Modoc County. Further, ANCSA specifically ended federal superintendence over the Venetie Tribe's lands. Quite contrarily, no such action has been taken regarding the land of the Alturas and Cedarville Rancherias. Modoc is merely an extension of the Rancherias. (*See Dille, supra*).

Pink correctly cites *Venetie* for its determination that the social programs in that case were "not indicia of active federal control over the Tribe's land sufficient to support a finding of federal superintendence." *Id.* at 955. However, the healthcare provided by Modoc is different, since Modoc is a consortium of tribes empowered under ISDA grants to provide healthcare services to the Indian community.

CONCLUSION

The decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in this matter is consistent with previous rulings of this Court, other Circuit Courts of Appeals and congressional mandates. Based on the foregoing, we respectfully request that this Court deny Pink's Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT J. LOGAN
Attorney for Respondents
Modoc Indian Health Project, Inc.
and Erin Forrest
255 West Julian Street
Suite 302
San Jose, CA 95110
(408) 287-2156